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Introduction 
James Madison suggested that the interdependencies between branches of government would 
serve to check and balance power, and that the structure of such relations is an auxiliary control 
to democratic accountability.1 He may not have expected the routine administrative functions of 
government to demand such control, but apparently some do. This essay examines a statutory 
proposal to mitigate the costs of a dysfunctional routine federal process and concludes that 
Madison is right: Shortcutting the interdependencies by removing “their mutual relations”2
Background 
 
would be more costly than accepting the inefficiency.  
The Constitution of the United States conditions that “no money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”3 This is a positive rule: the 
expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds 
may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.4
The Constitutional prohibition is enforced through portions of Title 31 of the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations, derived from and still commonly referred to as the Antideficiency Act.
 Being a positive rule, in those instances when 
an appropriation is not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, there may be a lapse in funding.  
5 
The statute prohibits an officer or employee of the federal government from making or 
authorizing an expenditure of funds in the absence of, or in excess of, an appropriation. Without 
an appropriation, a shutdown of the affected functions of government ensues with exceptions for 
emergencies. Such shutdowns have occurred on 17 occasions in the last 35 years, 6
To the contrary, Congress normally passes several temporary spending measures each year in 
order to avoid a government shutdown. It is so typical, that in only three of the last 60 years has 
Congress avoided the need to pass a temporary spending measure to avert a shutdown.
 the most 
recent – and perhaps most impactful – occurred in fiscal year 1996. The fact that a shutdown has 
not occurred in over a decade does not mean that Congresses have completed all the 
appropriation bills on time. 
7
Definition and Operation of CRs 
 Failing 
to appropriate funds for the operation of the entire federal government before the fiscal year 
begins is the norm.  
Temporary spending measures are called continuing appropriation acts or more commonly, 
continuing resolutions (CR). The Congressional Research Service reports that in the past 14 
years, Congress has passed 87 CRs.8 In that period, on average, the last appropriation was 
completed 130 days after the start of the fiscal year.9 In extreme cases – which happened twice in 
the last six years – the majority of the federal government was funded under “temporary” 
measures for the entire fiscal year.10  For fiscal year 2011, only the National Defense 
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Appropriations Act was enacted (196 days late) and the remaining functions of government were 
funded for the entire year under a series of eight CRs.11
A CR differs from a regular appropriations act in two important ways.  First, a regular 
appropriations act is generally written in consonance with (or actually serves as) the authorizing 
legislation for those government functions.  Most government functions change at least a little 
from year to year: programs are added, revised or terminated; eligibility rules differ, the scope 
and duration of activities are altered, capital investments or divestments are approved and 
funded, or programs migrate from one agency to another. In the absence of the new 
appropriations act, the authorized program is “frozen” in the prior year configuration.
 
12
The second difference concerns the amount of funding available and the time period during 
which it is available. A regular appropriations act contains sufficient funding for the entire fiscal 
year, barring some contingency.  A CR is usually limited in amount to a formula that is tied to 
either the prior year level of funding, the President’s proposed budget, the Congressional Budget 
Resolution, or the lower of those three. The CR is also designed to be temporary. Of the 87 CRs 
between 19998 and 2011, the average duration was 30 days, and 42 of them were for one week 
or less.
  A new 
fighter jet may not transition from R&D to production, new clientele may not be served, an 
ineffectual program may not be terminated, nor may a pay raise be given to employees. 
13
The operation of the executive branch during a period of CR is tightly managed by the Office of 
Management and Budget and agency chief financial officers. Given the frequency with which 
CRs occur, administrative guidance has been refined over the years. Modern guidance traces its 
origin to opinions of the Attorney General during the Carter Administration
 
14 and is currently 
incorporated in circulars distributed by the Office of Management and Budget.15
The cost of CRs.   
 
Failing to appropriate funding for the federal government is problematic when viewed from any 
of several perspectives.16  From a legal perspective, it means agencies are operating under 
tentative authorities. The law should bring order to government operations and provide the 
executive the clear intent of the legislature; a CR fails to do that. CRs typically have eleven 
technical provisions describing the formula (rate of spending), apportionment rules, prohibitions 
against new starts, and other boilerplate limitations.17 As noted above, OMB and most agencies 
have administrative regulations for complying with these standard provisions, but Congress may 
also add specific provisions (anomalies) to CRs18
From a public management perspective, CRs are costly. There is inefficiency: slowing the 
development of new programs, hiring delays, and repetition of administrative tasks such as 
apportioning funding to subordinate organizations and placing small amounts of money on 
contracts for routine services. There is a cost to clientele as services are interrupted or fail to 
grow with inflation and adapt to demographic shifts. The uncertainty disrupts the implementation 
 that must be interpreted by the executive and 
against which administrative regulations must be compared. Because of CRs, instead of having a 
single appropriation with which to comply for the fiscal year, there are several, and time is 




of strategic plans and programmatic activity.19
From a political science perspective, CRs are symptomatic of political discord or a contested 
political agenda.
 Both the number of CRs and their duration 
impede agency productivity. 
20
CRs also have the potential to stymie the inherent oversight of executive agencies through the 
annual appropriations process. It is through the routine scrutiny of agency missions, projects, 
scope and size during budget deliberations that an important democratic oversight function 
occurs. It has been argued that serial CRs impact congressional deliberation and “do not reflect 
considered legislative judgment.”
 When the chambers of the legislature, political parties, or the legislature and 
executive cannot reconcile their positions concerning spending, the appropriations bills are 
usually late. Where concordance exists the bills are completed on time (as was the case for many 
of the national defense appropriations in the years immediately after the terrorist attacks in 
2001), but where there is discord bills are late.  In other cases, more urgent matters or elections 
distract the political agenda from routine business. It is not uncommon for appropriations to be 
incomplete going into the fall campaign season and CRs are written to fund agencies into 
January to allow the newly elected congress to finish the bills. Rarely are appropriations left to 
lame duck sessions of Congress. 
21
Continuing Resolutions are costly: they represent a problem for managers, a contingency for 
government employees and program clientele, and a symptom of political discordance. Over the 
years, legislators have proposed a mechanism to mitigate those costs. 
 
A Solution in Automatic Continuing Resolutions?  
Congress began considering the idea of an automatic continuing resolution (ACR) in the 1980s 
and over the last 20 years ACR proposals have been acted on by seven Congresses.22  Members 
of both the House and Senate of the current Congress have introduced bills with ACR 
provisions.23  An ACR generally works as follows: Title 31 of the U.S. Code would be amended 
to put a permanent mechanism in place to automatically create an appropriation to continue 
programs, projects and activities from the prior fiscal year, at approximately the same rate of 
spending as the prior year. The level of funding may be linked to the previous year or the 
president’s budget request; in some designs, the level of funding declines over time.24
None of these legislative proposals has been enacted and the current proposals seem likely to die 
in committee. The only one to pass both chambers and be presented to the President occurred in 
1997
  The 
primary goal of an ACR is to avoid a government shutdown; the secondary goals are to avoid the 
management and political churn associated with serial CRs.  
25
Arguments for ACRs 
 and President Clinton vetoed it for reasons to be discussed shortly. 
A shutdown erodes public confidence in government and an ACR would avoid that.26 
Managerially, the notion of an ACR is logical and beneficial. A shutdown exacerbates the costs 
of a CR by actually denying services to beneficiaries and the general public, by affecting private 
sector companies that do business with the government, by furloughing government employees, 
and by reducing the efficiency of the provision of services.27 Second, knowing in advance the 
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terms of an ACR and that its duration is unbounded gives the program manager freedom to plan 
and operate that does not occur under a series of short-term CRs.  
Politically, an ACR removes from the legislature the task of drafting and passing tentative 
spending measures, alleviating the crisis mode of operations, permitting them to focus on 
negotiating the regular appropriation.28
Legally, administrative regulations for the ACR could be crafted to conform to the terms of the 
funding in advance of the mechanism triggering, providing the executive greater certainty, 
eliminating the need to individually reconcile each CR with administrative regulations, speeding 
apportionment, and minimizing the risk of noncompliance. 
 It also removes the temptation to use CRs as a vehicle for 
legislative “riders” – provisions of law unrelated to the appropriation that are amended to the bill 
because the bill is perceived as one that must pass.  
Arguments against ACRs 
Opponents of ACRs base most of their arguments on adverse policy effects that would likely 
result from ill-advised incentives created in political processes.  One argument is that the 
presence of an ACR would engender a status quo bias. 29
Some fear that the presence of the ACR removes the urgency – and even the will – to finish the 
regular appropriations bill. The political cost of gridlock in the absence of an ACR is a 
government shutdown which is significantly higher than the cost of accepting the status quo 
under an ACR. And the status quo may exact a smaller political cost than negotiating a change to 
a program. To some legislators, the politically prudent act would be to do nothing. 
  Those who favor either an increase or 
decrease in funding for a given program could see the appropriations process hindered. Rather 
than engage in negotiation or compromise on a new spending level, the opponent of the change 
simply needs to obstruct the change effort and let the automatic spending take over.  
Individual spending decisions are a touchstone of the annual budget and appropriations process. 
Each year, the size, scope and reach of thousands of functions of government and individual 
investment decisions are deliberated. With an ACR and its status quo bias, the annual ritual 
could devolve into a process of exception instead of a process of deliberation. Over time, all of 
the discretionary spending accounts could be perceived as mandatory spending and a deliberate 
action to effect a change becomes politically risky, much like today with proposed changes to 
“third rail” programs like Social Security.  
In turn, if there is no engagement over funding decisions, there are fewer opportunities for 
legislative oversight. The incentives for inaction can be viewed as an abdication of congressional 
responsibility and a diminution of electoral accountability.30
The reasons given by President Clinton for vetoing the ACR provision in 1997 was that it 
“would provide resources … below the level contained in the Bipartisan Budget Agreement” and 
that the negotiated agreement was “consistent with our values and principles. Putting the 
Government’s finances on automatic pilot is not.”
  
31
Legally, there are concerns about the link between ACRs and CBO’s rules for scorekeeping. 
Deficit control measures such as the PAYGO budget enforcement mechanism
 
32 would be 
confounded by automatic spending measures.  And for the Defense Department, the Constitution 
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explicitly prohibits appropriations “for a longer Term than two Years”33
Conclusion 
 and a funding 
mechanism of indefinite duration could run afoul of that constitutional provision. 
With only three years in 60 without a CR, some would argue the appropriations process is a 95 
percent failure. But, clearly, the functions of government have not been irreparably harmed. 
Government may be less efficient, but the Founding Fathers did not envision an efficient 
government. To the contrary, they intentionally designed an inefficient one. One in which the 
branches are expected to be interdependent. 
The costs of that failure manifest in management and social impacts from reduced efficiency and 
effectiveness of government programs. These can be considered economic transaction costs of 
our form of government. While the mechanism of an ACR could mitigate those costs, it comes at 
an unacceptably high price to our political system and fundamental values as a nation. Perhaps it 
is a blessing none have been enacted. Until a better proposal comes along (or the basic structures 
and incentives of governing change) it appears we have to accept an ironic state of affairs: failure 
is preferable: “An outcome for which no feasible superior alternative can be described and 
implemented with net gains is presumed to be efficient.”34
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